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The purpose of the present study is to examine the relationship
between the ownership structure, IPO underpricing, and liquidity of
venture firms. More precisely, the study empirically investigates whether
ownership disperses when a venture firm underpriced its IPO, whether
the liquidity of a firm increases when ownership was diversified, and
whether the liquidity of a firm increases when a firm underpriced its IPO.
The data for this study were collected from the firms that were
initially listed on KOSDAQ via an IPO between January 1, 2004 and
December 31, 2007. Although the lockup system was first introduced to
KOSDAQ in March 1999, the market maker system was abolished in
September 2003. Thus, in order to insure the constituency of the sample,
we only collected the firms that were listed on KOSDAQ after September
2003. Among the total of 193 firms that were listed during the 4-year
window period, we selected 112 firms that were available for our study.
Those that were delisted from the market and classified as issues for
administration as of December 2007 were excluded.
The results of this study are as follows; Firstly, we analysed if
abnormal returns of IPOs existed in the KOSDAQ market. We found that
on the 7th day of post IPO (t=7), the cumulative abnormal return was
the highest (23.69%). The underpricing level was at its peak on this day.
It started declining after the 7th day, and on the +30th day, it was
4.66% of CAR. During 30 days of trading, the average abnormal return
was 0.16%. This implies that the IPOs of the venture firms are
underpriced compared to the market price. This result is consistent with
the findings of Booth and Chua (1996).
Secondly, we analysed the abnormal return during the lockup
exoneration days which are between -15 and +15 window days (31
days). We found that the CAR between -15 and -1 days of the event
was -0.25%, -0.07% on the event day (D-0), and -0.54% between
-15 and +15 days. This means that the average CAR is -0.017%.
These results support the previous study of Field and Hanka (2001) that
reported a negative return after the lockup day.
Thirdly, we explored whether the underpricing of IPOs had an
impact on the change of the number of shareholders. We found that ①
the greater the underpricing of IPOs, the higher the number of
stockholders. This finding is consistent with that of Booth and Chua
(1996) and Brennan and Franks (1997); The number of shareholders②
who invested into venture capital firms significantly increased after IPO
was posted; The greater the ratio of flotation, the higher the number③
of stockholders.
Fourthly, we analysed the impact of underpricing of IPO on the
change of shareholders after the closing of lockup. We found that the①
venture firms that were listed with greater underpricing of IPO showed a
significant increase of shareholders. This result supports the findings of
Booth and Chua (1996) and Brennan and Franks (1997); The number②
of stockholders of the venture firms which venture capital companies
invested significantly increased after the end of lockup; The venture③
businesses with higher ratio of flotation showed a significant increase of
shareholders after the closing of lockup.
Fifthly, we explored the influence of the underpricing of IPO on the
change of large shareholders. We found that the number of①
shareholders of the venture firms who underpriced IPOs still increased
after the closing of lockup. This result is consistent with the findings of
Booth and Chua (1996) and Brennan and Franks (1997); The share of②
the large stockholders of the venture firms that a venture capital
company invested decreased significantly after the end of lockup; The③
venture businesses with higher ratio of flotation showed a significant
decreasing of shareholders after the end of lockup.
Sixthly, we examined the impact of the disperse of ownership on
the liquidity of IPO. We found that after the closing of lockup, as the①
number of the stockholders increased, the ownership was more
diversified and the liquidity increased with the active trading of small
shareholders. This is consistent with the theory of inefficiency of the
market proposed by Ofek and Richardson (2000) and Field and Hanka
(2001); After the end of lockup, as the share of the major②
shareholders decreased, ownership became dispersed and the liquidity of
IPOs increased. This finding supports that of Booth and Chua (1996); ③
As the share of a venture capital company's investment decreased after
the end of lockup, ownership dispersion became evident and IPO liquidity
increased.
Finally, we analysed the influence of IPO underpricing on liquidity.
We found that IPO stocks that showed a higher underpricing showed a①
greater trading volume after the closing of lockup. This means that the
size of underpricing has a positive relationship with trading volume. It
proves that underpricing leads the liquidity of IPO high; The greater②
number of shareholders after the end of lockup raised trading volume,
thus enhanced liquidity. Our finding is consistent with Zheng and Li
(2008)'s investor attention hypothesis; As the share of the major③
shareholders decreased after the end of lockup, the trading volume
increased and so did the liquidity of firm; After the lockup finished, as④
the investment share of venture capital firms diminished, the trading
volume increased and so did the liquidity.
In conclusion, the findings show that IPO underpricing has a positive
relationship with ownership dispersion, and the latter leads the liquidity
of IPO. We also conclude that there is a positive relationship between
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락 업  해 제  전 후  초 과 수 익 률
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